"In this exquisitely written book, Denery draws on centuries of rumination on the moral issues surrounding lying to address the question of how we should live in a fallen world. The serpent in the Garden of Eden led humankind astray with lies. The Devil is the father of lies. Premodern sources agonized constantly over the act of lying. Denery not only superbly narrates the long history of this obsession, but also locates the conditions that reveal an Enlightenment shift toward a (...) not entirely comfortable modernity."--William Chester Jordan, Princeton University "Can God lie? Are women 'born liars'? These are just two of the questions Denery asks--and answers--in his wide-ranging, erudite study. Written in an engaging and accessible style, The Devil Wins sheds a new and fascinating light on a mendacious world stretching from the Book of Genesis to the dawn of the Enlightenment."--Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski, author of Poets, Saints, and Visionaries of the Great Schism, 1378-1417 "This is a wonderful and beautifully written book. The fruit of extensive research, The Devil Wins traces the history of lying and deception through the medieval and early modern periods. Denery offers compelling and immensely significant arguments."--Ian P. Wei, author of Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris "This is a marvelous book. Denery uses a fundamental question--when, if ever, is it acceptable to lie?--to explore a vast intellectual and historical terrain. In doing so, he gives us one of the most subtle and penetrating briefs I have read for the importance of medieval thought for modern efforts to understand ethics, politics, and conscience. I read this book with enormous delight."--Jonathan Sheehan, author of The Enlightenment Bible. (shrink)

The attitudes of the Greeks, a Mediterranean population, to the issue of telling the truth to the patient have been studied. There is no clear answer to the question: 'Do the Greeks wish to be informed of the nature of their illness?'. The answer is: 'It depends'. It depends on age, education, family status, occupation, place of birth and residence and on whether or not they are religious people. However, it does not depend on their sex--men and women have similar (...) reactions to the issue of truth-telling. Although the present study shows lower percentages of those who wish to know the truth than studies on other populations, the conclusion is that, emphasising the need for good communication between doctors and patients, doctors should not lie, but should disclose to their patients the part of the truth they are ready to accept. (shrink)

The present paper traces some of the main articulations of the book Marcel Proust and the signs (1964), in which the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze affirms the superiority of literature on classical rationalist philosophy in the search for truth. Proust’s work rivals the philosophy itself, since it brings into play the involuntary nature of memory and intelligence – a condition which lies at the beginning of every thought – which can grasp the truth only solicited and forced by chance encounters. (...) Classical rationalist philosophy as a methodical exercise, induced by the good will of the thinker, can instead reach only abstract and conventional truths. The paper underlines how, according to Deleuze, Proust’s work will represent the model of authentic philosophy, the one that comes to produce with violence new concepts forced by problems and urgencies that impose themselves from outside. In fact, in Difference and Repetition (1968), the characteristics ascribed to the Proustian Recherche are explicitly attributed to a philosophy of Difference, which is posited by the author as the real need of his own time. In 1991, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari posed the question: What is philosophy? The attributes previously assigned to the literature, reappeared in the answer to such a question. A paradoxical necessity – reached through contingent encounters on one side, and the involuntary nature of thought on the other side – will appear at the center of the book that closes the theoretical trajectory of Deleuze: such a paradox shows itself as the only condition for the “invention of concepts”, which is at the same time the definition and ultimate task of philosophical practice. (shrink)

The main motivation of the paper lies in an argument which shows the relevance of the topological notion of lifting for semantic theory. After a brief examination of aspects of knowledge which are described by means of concepts of algebraic geometry, the development of a functorial connection between topology and group theory is related to aspects of logical analysis. In categorical terms, lifting is, with extension, a form of division. As such it is investigated here, starting from simple examples in (...) general topology up to fiber spaces and topoi, in order to appreciate the recurrent pattern, which is finally used to explain the understanding of sentences about abstract domains. (shrink)

The essay proposes an interpretation of the myth of the cave as a passage from a digital ontology to a non-digital ontology. This passage implies a reconsideration of Parmenidean and Pythagorean ontology, for which the discovery of incommensurable magnitudes is central. In particular, it allows an exteriority to a given system to be conceptualized, in which the possibility of an exit and then of freedom lies.

Dallas Willard makes the claim that spiritual formation “refers to the Spirit-driven process of forming the inner world of the human self in such a way that it becomes like the inner being of Christ himself.”1 Can this claim be substantiated and stand up to close scrutiny, or is Dallas Willard selecting an idea of his own fancy and making this the cornerstone of his understanding of spiritual formation? How can this claim be tested and anchored? In this (...) article we will seek to answer these questions by looking at the Apostle Paul in his function as spiritual director. Although it is patently anachronistic to speak of Paul as spiritual director, can we legitimately understand him in this role? We will propose a generative understanding of spiritual direction and then proceed to examine the Apostle Paul and his aims based on that generative understanding. We will also argue that at the core of Paul's functioning as a spiritual director lies a strong appeal to examine and imitate his life and character and to follow his ways. This appeal by Paul for others to imitate him is anchored in Paul's own imitation of Christ himself. Paul's call to imitation thus provides a window into discovering how Paul understood his role as spiritual director and also provides us the means to discern his goals in spiritual direction. (shrink)

RIASSUNTO Antonio Rosmini e Alexis de Tocqueville hanno contribuito, nell'orizzonte del pensiero politico del XIX secolo, alla configurazione di un nuovo modello di filosofia politica che crediamo conservi ancora oggi spunti di grande attualità. Il presente articolo assume come scopo quello di descrivere il dialogo ideale tra i due autori in modo da lasciar emergere quella che possiamo definire una terza via sorta davanti ai problemi sociali della discussione politica dell'ottocento, ossia una terza via tra le precedenti soluzioni della restaurazione (...) cattolica da una parte e lo spirito rivoluzionario francese dall'altra. Il cammino ideale nasce dal rinvenimento di una comune antropologia dalla quale si giungerà a una definizione della società fondata a partire dal fine che maggiormente la contraddistingue, il bene del singolo. L'urgenza e attualità dei temi che permeano gli scritti di Rosmini e Tocqueville crediamo risieda nella messa in evidenza di pericoli e storture, che oggi dominano le nostre società, ma che i nostri autori sono stati in grado di individuare sul nascere, cosi come si stavano formando nella società occidentale del XIX secolo. ABSTRACT Antonio Rosmini and Alexis de Tocqueville contributed, on the horizon of nineteenth-century political thought, to the configuration of a new model of political philosophy that we believe still retains insights of great relevance today. This article takes as its purpose to describe the ideal dialogue between the two authors in such a way as to let emerge what we may call a third way that arose before the social problems of political discussion in the 1800s, that is, a third way between the earlier solutions of Catholic restoration on the one hand and the French revolutionary spirit on the other. The ideal path arose from the rediscovery of a common anthropology from which a definition of society founded from the end that most distinguishes it, the good of the individual, would be arrived at. The urgency and topicality of the themes that permeate the writings of Rosmini and Tocqueville we believe lie in the highlighting of dangers and distortions, which dominate our societies today, but which our authors were able to identify in the bud, as they were being formed in 19th century Western society. (shrink)

This paper examines the ways Merleau-Ponty and Nancy think about light, a central theme in Western philosophy closely tied with form and intelligibility. The first section of this paper points out that each thinker replaces the “highest moment of light,” where it is relieved of its weight and materiality, with darkness, where light instead emerges from some apophantic depth indissociable from the material. The second section of this paper gives a critique of darkness in Nancy from Merleau-Ponty’s perspective. According to (...) the latter’s view, Nancy’s claim that darkness is distinct from the structures of intentionality and instead has to do with a presentation of the inappropriable fact of things would be untenable. The difference between the thinkers relates to how each thinks about negation after their very similar critiques of light and form. Still, I argue, the same critique of presentation in Nancy ought to also be applied to Merleau-Ponty, or at least to the usual way he is thought to favour the sensible instead of intelligibility. In the third section of this paper I consider one of Merleau-Ponty’s phrases, “there is no painting before painting,” a statement I take to be about how explicit formal structures, and thus also light and line, comes from a sensible register that does not lack variation and is not totally “deformed,” to use Nancy’s word that describes the homogeneity of a sensible field. Cet essai examine les différentes façons qu’ont Merleau-Ponty et Nancy de penser la lumière, un thème central de la philosophie occidentale, et qui est étroitement lié avec les idées de forme et d’intelligibilité. La première section montre que les deux penseurs remplacent le « plus haut moment de la lumière », qui est sans poids ni matérialité, par l’obscurité, si bien que la lumière émerge d’une profondeur apophantique indissociable de la matérialité. La deuxième section propose un critique de l’obscurité chez Nancy d’une perspective merleau-pontienne. Pour Merleau-Ponty, l’affirmation de Nancy selon laquelle l’obscurité se distingue des structures de l’intentionalité et a plutôt affaire à la présentation du fait inappropriable de la chose serait tout à fait intenable. La différence entre les deux penseurs concerne la façon dont chacun pense la négation à partir d’une critique similaire de la lumière et de la forme. J’avance pourtant que la même critique de la présentation chez Nancy devrait aussi être appliquée à Merleau-Ponty, ou du moins à la façon dont il est habituellement vu comme préférant le sensible contre l’intelligible. Dans la troisième section, j’évalue la phrase de Merleau-Ponty, « la peinture n’existe pas avant la peinture », phrase qui selon moi concerne la façon dont les structures formelles explicites, et donc la forme et la ligne, proviennent d’un registre sensible qui n’est pas sans variations et donc pas totalement « déformé », pour utiliser le mot que Nancy emploie pour décrire l’homogénéité du champ sensible.Questo articolo prende in esame i modi in cui Merleau-Ponty e Nancy riflettono sulla luce, un tema centrale nella filosofia occidentale e strettamente connesso a quelli della forma e dell’intelligibilità. La prima sezione dell’articolo mostra come entrambi i pensatori sostituiscano “il più alto momento della luce”, che la libera dal suo peso e dalla sua materialità, con l’oscurità, in cui invece la luce emerge da una profondità apofantica indissociabile dalla sfera materiale. La seconda sezione offre una critica del concetto di oscurità in Nancy dal punto di vista di Merleau-Ponty. Secondo una prospettiva merleau-pontiana, la tesi di Nancy che l’oscurità sia distinta dalle strutture dell’intenzionalità e sia invece connessa a una presentazione dell’aspetto inappropriabile delle cose sarebbe insostenibile. La differenza tra i due pensatori riguarda il modo in cui ciascuno di essi elabora l’idea di negazione, a partire da due analisi della luce e della forma molto simili. Tuttavia, come cerco di mostrare, la stessa obiezione all’idea di presentazione in Nancy dovrebbe essere applicata anche a Merleau-Ponty, o quantomeno al modo in cui di norma si ritiene egli prediliga il sensibile piuttosto che l’intelligibile. Nella terza sezione, prendo in esame una frase di Merleau-Ponty, “non c’è pittura prima della pittura”, che a mio avviso si riferisce a come le strutture formali esplicite, e dunque anche la luce e la linea, provengano da un registro sensibile che non è privo di variazioni e che non è totalmente “deformato”, per impiegare un termine di Nancy che descrive l’omogeneità di un campo sensibile. (shrink)

Gli storici della filosofia solitamente attribuiscono ai pensatori moderni l'invenzioni di concetto "soggetto", "oggetto" e "soggettività" e li concepiscono in direttamente in contrasto con la filosofia scolastica e aristotelica. Questo articolo suggerisce la presenza di una proto-teoria della soggettività in Aristotele. La teoria aristotelica della soggettività è fondata principalmente su quattro dottrine. In primo luogo, si può riscontrare nell'epistemologia aristotelica la presenza di una "prospettiva" e di un "punto di vista". Il secondo aspetto significativo è il concetto di determinazione dell'oggetto (...) della conoscenza, che nella filosofia aristotelica è rappresentato dalla nozione di "prosthesis". La terza dottrina si fonda sulla distinzione fra ciò che è più conoscibile per noi e ciò che è più conoscibile per natura. L'ultima dottrina riguarda la seconda natura del soggetto e gli abiti della conoscenza acquisiti attraverso l'esperienza, i quali spiegano perché i soggetti abbiano conoscenze diverse degli stessi oggetti secondo le loro precedenti esperienzePhilosophers usually attribute to modernity the invention of concepts like 'subject', 'object' and 'subjectivity' and they understand them in contrast to Scholastic and Aristotelian philosophies. The present paper suggests the presence of a proto-theory of subjectivity in Aristotle. The Aristotelian theory of subjectivity is grounded principally on four doctrines. First, we can recognize the presence of a 'perspective' and of a 'point of view' in the Aristotelian epistemology. The second relevant aspect is the concept of determination of the object of knowledge, which is in Aristotelian philosophy the notion of 'prosthesis'. The third doctrine lies on the distinction between 'what is more known to us' and 'what is more known by nature'. The last doctrine concerns the 'second nature' of the subject and the habits of knowledge acquired by experience, which explain why knowing subjects have different cognitions of the same object according to their own previous experience. (shrink)

The unprecedented rise and fall in silver's price during 1979 and 1980 resulted in charges against the Hunt brothers of Dallas of monopolization and market manipulation, charges which led to a lengthy trial. This book focuses on the economic analysis used at this trial. Drawing upon interviews with the judge, jury, attorneys and expert witnesses, it investigates the elusive definition of manipulation in sophisticated markets, the difficulties of interpreting statistical evidence, the imprecision in calculating damages, the hidden assumptions behind (...) inferences concerning intent, and the hazards introduced when economic analysis enters complex litigation. The author concludes that these problems induce courtroom procedures to oversimplify the economic analysis and cause the law on market manipulation to be created retroactively. Yet the failure lies not with the legal institutions but with the futures exchanges who had not developed in advance the rules to minimize large-scale trading during the unusual price moves. (shrink)

My account of the causal role of consciousness in a physical world is modeled on Dretske’s celebrated explanation of the causal role of beliefs (something that Dretske himself never offered). First, behavior must be understood as a (broadly individuated) process that begins with some external stimulus causing some neurological event C, and ends with causing a bodily movement M (e.g., the Kennedy assassination is a process that begins with Oswald pulling the trigger at 12:30pm CST on November 23 in 1963 (...) in Dallas, Texas, but only ends half an hour later when Kennedy is pronounced dead at 1 pm CST). The internal neurological event C causes bodily movement M, but only by virtue of being recruited by natural selection to represent the instantiation of some external property F when properly stimulated under normal circumstances. But the reason why C causes M lies in the fact that C represents the instantiation of the external property F. I withdraw my hand from a hot surface because the activation of nociceptive specific neurons in my parietal lobe (together with the activation of neuronal patterns in my motor cortices) was recruited by natural selection to represent the tissue damage in my hand. The activation of nociceptive specific neurons causes my hand to withdraw but for the reason that it represents tissue data at the time that I felt pain in my hand. (shrink)

Philosophers usually attribute to modernity the invention of concepts like 'subject', 'object' and 'subjectivity' and they understand them in contrast to Scholastic and Aristotelian philosophies. The present paper suggests the presence of a proto-theory of subjectivity in Aristotle. The Aristotelian theory of subjectivity is grounded principally on four doctrines. First, we can recognize the presence of a 'perspective' and of a 'point of view' in the Aristotelian epistemology. The second relevant aspect is the concept of determination of the object of (...) knowledge, which is in Aristotelian philosophy the notion of 'prosthesis'. The third doctrine lies on the distinction between 'what is more known to us' and 'what is more known by nature'. The last doctrine concerns the 'second nature' of the subject and the habits of knowledge acquired by experience, which explain why knowing subjects have different cognitions of the same object according to their own previous experienceGli storici della filosofia solitamente attribuiscono ai pensatori moderni l'invenzioni di concetto "soggetto", "oggetto" e "soggettività" e li concepiscono in direttamente in contrasto con la filosofia scolastica e aristotelica. Questo articolo suggerisce la presenza di una proto-teoria della soggettività in Aristotele. La teoria aristotelica della soggettività è fondata principalmente su quattro dottrine. In primo luogo, si può riscontrare nell'epistemologia aristotelica la presenza di una "prospettiva" e di un "punto di vista". Il secondo aspetto significativo è il concetto di determinazione dell'oggetto della conoscenza, che nella filosofia aristotelica è rappresentato dalla nozione di "prosthesis". La terza dottrina si fonda sulla distinzione fra ciò che è più conoscibile per noi e ciò che è più conoscibile per natura. L'ultima dottrina riguarda la seconda natura del soggetto e gli abiti della conoscenza acquisiti attraverso l'esperienza, i quali spiegano perché i soggetti abbiano conoscenze diverse degli stessi oggetti secondo le loro precedenti esperienze. (shrink)

L’admiration de Paul Ricoeur pour Merleau-Ponty est connue, lui qui entendait donner à la Phénoménologie de la perception sa « contrepartie pratique » avec le premier tome de la Philosophie de la volonté, Le Volontaire et l’involontaire. Il faut d’emblée s’étonner que celui-ci n’ait pas reconnu la teneur pratique de la philosophie de son aîné, dont les diverses analyses au Collège de France, et en particulier l’intérêt marqué de Merleau-Ponty pour la pensée marxiste comme philosophie de l’homme charnel, et le (...) motif naturaliste de l’être agissant et souffrant à partir de 1956, font état. Car c’est bien depuis ce motif que Ricoeur, en 2004, expose le parcours de la reconnaissance : de l’homme agissant et souffrant, à l’homme capable. L’enjeu, nous semble-t-il alors, de ces deux philosophies en leur dimension pratique se résume aisément par les exigences formulées par Paul Ricoeur dans l’ouvrage Soi-même comme un autre, en particulier lorsque celui-ci se donne pour but de « déterminer les traits nouveaux de l’ipséité correspondant à la pratique politique » – détermination du Soi agent qui se dessine, au dire même de l’auteur, à la croisée d’une phénoménologie de l’agir et d’une ontologie du Soi. En effet, comme le souligne Ricoeur, l’effacement paradoxal de la question de l’ipséité dans la philosophie morale kantienne, entre autres, s’explique par l’absence d’une telle théorie de l’action. En bref, le « Je veux » analysé en 1950 par Ricoeur s’ancre dans un « Je peux », qui ne se limite jamais au seul plan spatial chez Merleau-Ponty. Ainsi, à la figure phénoménologique de nos expériences de la passivité correspond la catégorie ontologique de l’altérité, mentionnée par l’expression du Visible et de l’invisible reprise en titre de cet article et dont l’attribution à Ricoeur ne choquerait pas.Paul Ricoeur’s admiration for Merleau-Ponty is well-known given that he presented his “practical counterpart” to the Phenomenology of Perception in the form of his Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary. One is immediately surprised that this is not recognized as the practical content of his predecessor’s philosophy given the diverse analyses at the Collège de France of which, in particular, the marked interest Merleau-Ponty had in Marxist thought as the philosophy of the fleshly human being, as well as the naturalist motif of the active and suffering being beginning in 1956, are part. For, it is due to this motif that Ricoeur, in 2004, presents the trajectory of recognition: from the active and suffering human being to the capable human being. As we see them, the stakes in these two philosophies, as far as their practical dimensions are concerned, are easily summarized by the requirements Paul Ricoeur formulated in his work, Oneself as Another. This is particularly the case given that this text has for its aim, “determining the new traits of individual identity which correspond to practical politics” – the determination of Self as a self-designing agent, which, according to the author, lies at the intersection of a phenomenology of action and an ontology of the Self. In fact, as Ricoeur himself underlines, the paradoxical effacement of the question of ipseity in Kantian moral philosophy, among others, is explained by the absence of just such a theory of action. Briefly, the “I want” analysis by Ricoeur in 1950 is anchored in the “I can,” which is never limited to the single spatial outline we find in Merleau-Ponty. Thus, to the phenomenological figure of our experiences of passivity correspond the ontological category of alterity, as mentioned in the phrase from The Visible and the Invisible taken up in the title of this article and which it would not be shocking to attribute to Ricoeur.È ben nota l’ammirazione di Paul Ricoeur per Merleau-Ponty: col primo tomo della Philosophie de la volonté, intitolato Le Volontaire et l’involontaire, Paul Ricoeur intendeva offrire alla Fenomenologia della percezione una vera e propria “contropartita pratica”. Ma è singolare il fatto che Ricoeur non abbia riconosciuto il risvolto pratico presente nella filosofia del suo predecessore, risvolto ampiamente attestato nei corsi merleau-pontyani al Collège de France e in particolare nelle lezioni che pongono al centro delle loro analisi il pensiero marxista come filosofia dell’uomo carnale e il motivo naturalistico dell’uomo agente e dell’uomo sofferente almeno a partire dal 1956. È proprio prendendo le mosse da questo motivo che Ricoeur nel 2004 espone quanto definisce come il percorso del riconoscimento: dall’uomo agente e dall’uomo sofferente all’uomo “capace”. La posta in gioco, ci sembra, di queste due filosofie, considerate nella loro dimensione pratica, si riassume facilmente nelle esigenze che Ricoeur formula nel suo libro Sé come un altro, in particolare quando si assegna il compito di “determinare i tratti peculiari dell’ipseità corrispondente alla pratica politica” – cioè di determinare i tratti di quel Sé agente che si delinea, a dire dell’autore stesso, al crocevia tra una fenomenologia dell’agire e un’ontologia del Sé. In effetti, come sottolinea Ricoeur, la paradossale cancellazione dell’ipseità operata dalla filosofia morale kantiana si spiega tra l’altro con l’assenza di una adeguata teoria dell’azione. In breve, l’“Io voglio” analizzato da Ricoeur nel 1950 si àncora in un “Io posso” che non si limita mai, in Merleau-Ponty, al solo piano spaziale. Così, alla figura fenomenologica delle nostre esperienze di passività, corrisponde la categoria ontologica dell’alterità, che proprio Il visibile e l’invisibile menziona con l’espressione che noi riprendiamo nel titolo di questo articolo e che ci si aspetterebbe essere anzitutto ricoeuriana. (shrink)

Based on an unfinished manuscript by the late philosopher Dallas Willard, this book makes the case that the 20th century saw a massive shift in Western beliefs and attitudes concerning the possibility of moral knowledge, such that knowledge of the moral life and of its conduct is no longer routinely available from the social institutions long thought to be responsible for it. In this sense, moral knowledge--as a publicly available resource for living--has disappeared. Via a detailed survey of main (...) developments in ethical theory from the late 19th through the late 20th centuries, Willard explains philosophy's role in this shift. In pointing out the shortcomings of these developments, he shows that the shift was not the result of rational argument or discovery, but largely of arational social forces--in other words, there was no good reason for moral knowledge to have disappeared. The Disappearance of Moral Knowledge is a unique contribution to the literature on the history of ethics and social morality. Its review of historical work on moral knowledge covers a wide range of thinkers including T.H Green, G.E Moore, Charles L. Stevenson, John Rawls, and Alasdair MacIntyre. But, most importantly, it concludes with a novel proposal for how we might reclaim moral knowledge that is inspired by the phenomenological approach of Knud Logstrup and Emmanuel Levinas. Edited and eventually completed by three of Willard's former graduate students, this book marks the culmination of Willard's project to find a secure basis in knowledge for the moral life. (shrink)

In response to the common assumption of perpetual moral and spiritual failure in human life, this article offers a view of personal transformation and, in particular, of the role of the human will in such formation, that clears a way forward in progressive conformity to the character of Christ. Drawing from St. Paul's understanding of the “flesh” and the human “spirit,” distinctions are made between the impulsive, the reflective, and the embodied will. It is the embodied/reflective will of the person (...) that is captured by Christ through inner transformation, such that the crucifixion of the flesh and walking by the Spirit brings about routine, easy obedience to Christ, from the inside out. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Croire et savoir: Les principes de la connaissance selon Nicolas d’AutrécourtDallas G. Denery IIChristophe Grellard. Croire et savoir: Les principes de la connaissance selon Nicolas d’Autrécourt. Paris: J. Vrin, 2005. Pp. 313. Paper, €38,00.Nicholas of Autrecourt has often seemed to be one of those philosophers doomed to be best known for everything but their own ideas. Famously, if inaccurately, dubbed "the Medieval Hume" by one of his first (...) modern critics, the threat or fear of skepticism has in one way or another shaped most subsequent studies of Nicholas's work. While understandable, this really is unfortunate. Nicholas himself clearly states that his philosophical goal was to avoid the skeptical consequences that he believed were latent in the writings of his scholastic peers. In this excellent new work, the first monograph-length study devoted to Nicholas's thought in nearly 60 years, Christophe Grellard goes a long way towards recovering Nicholas's very real contributions to fourteenth-century intellectual life.Any attempt to interpret Nicholas's thought runs up against one significant problem—few of his works survive. All that remains are a fascinating and lengthy (not to mention, confusing and unfinished) work of natural philosophy, Exigit ordo, and several letters touching on issues in epistemology, cognition, and logic. As a result, even situating Nicholas's thought within the proper intellectual currents of the first decades of the fourteenth century has proven difficult. Whose work influenced him? Who were the objects of his criticism? What were his motives? Until recently, most scholars have attempted to trace the influence of William Ockham on Nicholas's thought. Drawing from recent work on the University of Paris during the fourteenth century, Grellard not only downplays Ockham's influence on Nicholas, but also Nicholas's membership in the faculty of theology. Rather, he stresses Nicholas's ongoing involvement in the arts faculty, where he continued to teach even as he studied for his degree in theology. This has two significant consequences. First, it allows Grellard to treat all of Nicholas's writings as contributions to the practice of natural philosophy. Indeed, in his compelling first chapter, Grellard contends that the initial sections of the Exigit, in which Nicholas famously condemns scholastic Aristotelianism as nothing more than an institutionalized pedagogy of error and untruth, must be read as a plea for a distinction between philosophy and theology, between speculation and faith. Even if Nicholas was not alone at the time in pushing for these distinctions (Ockham and John Buridan had argued along similar lines), Grellard demonstrates that Nicholas's approach was certainly the more radical and extreme. Second, the shift in focus from theology to arts brings with it a shift in Nicholas's most important interlocutors. To begin, Aristotle and Averroes become constant background forces in Nicholas's thought. Moreover, as the final section of Grellard's work makes clear, many of Nicholas's ideas are most usefully understood in light of writings of two other arts masters, John Buridan and Nicole Oresme, rather than in the context of debates among his contemporaries in the theology faculty. [End Page 119]These initial interpretive decisions shape the overall structure of Grellard's book, which moves, in three parts, from a deft analysis of Nicholas's theory of evidence and probability to his account of the objects of cognition and, finally, to a comparison of Nicholas's and Buridan's epistemological theories. Unlike so many prior studies that begin with Nicholas's famous critique of a fellow theologian's cognitive theories, thereby framing Nicholas's project in terms of theological debates concerning the intuitive cognition of non-existents and God's ability to cause false visions, Grellard begins with Nicholas's positive theory of knowledge. This effectively sidesteps the entire question of Nicholas's skepticism, a question Nicholas himself explicitly tried to avoid. Nicholas comes across as a philosopher keenly aware of the limits of human cognition, yet eager to develop a viable and wholly rational epistemology within those limits. Those limits, Grellard makes clear, have everything to do with appearances, with what we can rationally and legitimately infer about the world based upon what we see... (shrink)

Dallas G. Denery - Croire et savoir: Les principes de la connaissance selon Nicolas d'Autrecourt - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:1 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.1 119-120 Christophe Grellard. Croire et savoir: Les principes de la connaissance selon Nicolas d'Autrécourt. Paris: J. Vrin, 2005. Pp. 313. Paper, €38,00. Nicholas of Autrecourt has often seemed to be one of those philosophers doomed to be best known for everything but their own ideas. Famously, if inaccurately, dubbed "the (...) Medieval Hume" by one of his first modern critics, the threat or fear of skepticism has in one way or another shaped most subsequent studies of Nicholas's work. While understandable, this really is unfortunate. Nicholas himself clearly states that his philosophical goal was to avoid the skeptical consequences that he believed were latent in the writings of his scholastic peers. In this excellent new work, the first monograph-length study devoted to Nicholas's thought in nearly 60 years, Christophe Grellard goes a... (shrink)

In light of the allegations of sexual misconduct and harassment made against Harvey Weinstein and other powerful men in recent months, this paper will examine how men might take on responsibility for themselves and a culture that enables these patterns of abuse. It will draw primarily on the work of Judith Butler, Luce Irigaray, and Emmanuel Levinas to develop a model of responsibility that has three primary stages: taking ownership of past actions, critiquing gendered power relations, and learning how to (...) foster relationships that are “intersubjective.”. (shrink)

In Part II of Husserl’s “great last work,” as the Crisis is sometimes called, we find two passages in which he comments upon what he took to be an important and utter failure on the part of “die modernen Logistiker”—or, as Carr well translates it, “modern mathematical logicians.” At the end of subsection 36 he says.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Bonhoeffer the Assassin? Challenging the Myth, Recovering His Call to Peacemaking by Mark Thiessen Nation, Anthony G. Siegrist, and Daniel P. UmbelDallas J. GinglesBonhoeffer the Assassin? Challenging the Myth, Recovering His Call to Peacemaking Mark Thiessen Nation, Anthony G. Siegrist, and Daniel P. Umbel grand rapids, mi: baker academic, 2013. 272 pp. $29.99In their new book Bonhoeffer the Assassin?, Mark Thiessen Nation, Anthony G. Siegrist, and Daniel P. (...) Umbel painstakingly reread primary texts in order to challenge the widely held belief that Dietrich Bonhoeffer participated in an attempt to assassinate Adolf Hitler. Their alternative to the usual narrative of Bonhoeffer’s life holds that early in his career, long before the crisis of the Confessing Church and the rise of Nazism, Bonhoeffer made a commitment to [End Page 205] Christian pacifism that endured even through the war years and his resistance to Hitler.To argue for this alternative telling, the authors analyze Bonhoeffer’s three main “ethical” texts: the early “Barcelona lectures,” Discipleship, and finally Ethics. On their telling, while the early ethics lectures were theologically deficient, by the time that Bonhoeffer wrote Discipleship he had developed “integration,” which was “the primary theological catalyst for the ethical transition from Barcelona to Discipleship” (129). Discipleship is, they conclude, the pinnacle of Bonhoeffer’s thought, and anything that comes after it, including Ethics, cannot in any fundamental way differ from it.Alongside this diachronic analysis of Bonhoeffer’s main ethics texts, the authors emphasize two letters that Bonhoeffer wrote in 1935 and 1936. In the first, Bonhoeffer asserts that, because of his theology, he is “sometimes perceived as fanatical” (223). The second he wrote describing his “conversion experience” in 1930, in relation to the Sermon on the Mount and “Christian pacifism.” Read singly, these letters are interesting examples of Bonhoeffer’s thought and life of faith. As the authors present the argument, though, the letters comprise a unified narrative and function as an interpretive lens by which the primary texts should be understood. They think that the “fanaticism” of the first letter refers to the faith brought about in the conversion experience described in the second. The “fanaticism” letter is important because in it he asserts that, “if he were to become more ‘reasonable,’ he would have to ‘chuck [his] entire theology’” (223).Because Bonhoeffer wrote that he would have to “chuck” his theology if he made it more “reasonable,” the authors think that the theology that emerged from the conversion experience has a foundational role in his later works. Whatever Bonhoeffer wrote in Ethics, then, simply cannot disagree with the “fanaticism” that “is most fully articulated in … Discipleship” (223). Because of the importance of the “Christian pacifism” of the conversion and Discipleship, it is thus impossible—or at least highly unlikely—that Bonhoeffer participated in the assassination attempts.Bonhoeffer scholars and nonspecialists alike will find this text provocative and interesting. The conclusions, though, are finally unconvincing. For the authors, the “conversion experience” is the central key to understanding Bonhoeffer, and it is clear that they understand “Christian pacifism” to be of primary importance in the conversion, but they never tell us to what variety of Christian pacifism Bonhoeffer converted. It is very likely that Bonhoeffer’s Christian pacifism was different in kind than the Christian pacifism that the authors seem to endorse. That anachronistic reading alone renders the conclusions of the text suspect.Apart from simple historical questions, the methodology the authors use to construct their hermeneutical lens is also problematic. It is difficult to submit [End Page 206] Bonhoeffer’s entire corpus to two earlier letters that he wrote a full year apart. While readers may understand and agree that Bonhoeffer was not, in reality, an assassin (the minor claim), it will be hard to convince readers of the impassibility of his “Christian pacifism” (the major claim).Dallas J. GinglesSouthern Methodist UniversityCopyright © 2015 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Although treating the elderly occasion the same kinds of ethical issues as treating other patients, specific problems do arise when making decisions for persons, once competent, who no longer can express their values. I examine the problem of decisional incapacity and offer a critique of the principles, such as substituted judgment, and the instruments, such as advance directives, living wills, other instructional directives, as well as surrogate decision-makers.